Bio-inspired Innovation and National Security 2010 National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy BSE TSE PRION
Bio-inspired Innovation and National Security
Bio-inspired Innovation and National Security
edited by Robert E. Armstrong
Mark D. Drapeau
Cheryl A. Loeb
James J. Valdes
Published for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy by National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. 2010
FORWARD
Ever since man took to the battlefield, biology has played a significant role—both unintentionally and intentionally—in conflict. Prior to the discovery of the germ theory of disease, most combat deaths were the result of infections. And even before that understanding, biology was used in an offensive role. An early example was the Tatars’ hurling of plague victims’ bodies over the wall of the Crimean city of Kaffa in 1346, which probably helped spread the Black Death.
Despite various treaties and protocols, offensive biological weapons use has continued to this day, with the anthrax attacks of 2001 being the most recent incident. Such activity has led to a strong defensive program, with medical science developing numerous countermeasures that have benefited both civilian and military populations.
But that is the “old” biological warfare. Covert programs for the development of novel weapons will advance; likewise, the development of countermeasures will also continue. The present volume, however, does not address these issues. Rather, it reviews and analyzes current research and likely future developments in the life sciences and how they will significantly influence the biological material available to warfighters—not as weapons systems, but as augmentation to currently available equipment. This is the “new” face of biological warfare.
The editors of this volume have assembled experts in research, warfighting, and defense policy to describe biological applications from the smallest to the largest scale. In addition, they show how thinking in biological terms can improve our procurement cycle and enhance our development time and costs. Finally, no description of biotechnology would be complete without a consideration of ethical and legal issues related to such research and development.
This edited book is an important contribution to the literature and nicely captures a number of ongoing military basic science research projects with long-term implications for the Department of Defense. It does not purport to be an exhaustive accounting, but it is an excellent introduction for policymakers to garner an understanding of where biology is going to fit into 21st-century readiness and preparedness for our fighting force.
Andrew W. Marshall Director of Net Assessment U.S. Department of Defense
SNIP...
When a specific BW agent is known, prophylaxes (for example, vaccines) or therapeutics (for example, antibiotics) can be employed to prevent or treat the disease. However, when confronted by multiple possibilities, it is nearly impossible to defend against all of the agents. After defecting from the Soviet Union, Alibek indicated that the Soviet program did include a mix-andmatch capability, thus increasing the difficulty in countering such an attack. Even if vaccines were available for each agent, the combinations would likely have devastating health effects.
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1992, numerous programs, such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, have strived to keep former weapons scientists gainfully employed in their fields of expertise. The Soviet BW program, however, employed thousands of people, and only a small subset of the researchers have been hired via the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to prevent the spread of this technical knowledge. There have been cases where former Soviet BW scientists, with sufficient information to be quite dangerous, have either emigrated to suspected proliferant countries or attempted to sell their expertise on the black market. It is also known that terrorists groups such as al Qaeda have actively sought access to both BW information and weapons.
The second leg of the BW triad involves attacks against agriculture, both plants and animals. Despite decades of known research by many countries into biological weapons targeting agriculture, it has only recently been recognized as a national security threat. The potential impact of agroterrorism is huge. In the United States, farming employs only 2 percent of the population, but a total of 16 percent work in food- and fiber-related industries. This sector accounts for 11 percent of America’s gross domestic product and 23 percent of wheat, 54 percent of corn, and 43 percent of soybean exports.11
There is an extensive range of possible agents that could be used against crops and livestock. Some of them are zoonotic, meaning that the disease could be transmitted to humans via animal vectors. Among the most studied agents are anthrax, Rinderpest, African swine fever, foot and mouth disease, wheat blast fungus, fowl plague, and many others. In addition, there are many nonindigenous insects and rodents that could be used to spread disease, and these would be difficult to detect until a major outbreak has begun.
Agricultural production is vital to our economic interests. Unlike many industrial facilities, by its nature, agricultural production is geographically dispersed and thus nearly impossible to secure. Experience has shown that even a single case of a debilitating illness can shut down international trade for extended periods of time.
The potential impact that a limited BW attack could have on American products is seen in response to a case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), popularly known as mad cow disease. In December 2003, a single case of BSE was detected in the American food chain. This led to full or partial bans on beef imports by 65 countries at an estimated loss of over $2 billion each of the following years. Once import bans are established, it often takes years to lift them. While the introduction of BSE was not intentional, this example does point to the large economic vulnerabilities that exist in the agriculture sector.12
There are other examples, including intentional terrorist acts that...SNIP...END, SEE;
Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: [log in to unmask]
Docket No: 02-088-1
Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;
Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&docid=fr13de02-15.pdf
Greetings,
i would like to kindly submit to this docket and warn of the potential for biological 'suitcase bombs' from civilian air-traffic populations from known BSE/FMD and other exotic animal disease pathogens coming into the USA.
please be warned;
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 -080
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE ''USCS'' (unspecified species coding system) MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee
Change in Disease Status of Greece With Regard to Foot-and-Mouth
[Federal Register: March 21, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 55)]
snip...
Under Sec. 94.11, meat and other animal products of ruminants and swine, including ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing these meat or animal products, may not be imported into the United States except in accordance with Sec. 94.11 and the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service at 9 CFR chapter III.
snip...
From an economic standpoint, the proposed rule would have little or no impact on U.S. animal stock and commodities. There are two reasons. First, the proposed rule would not remove other disease-based restrictions on the importation of ruminants or swine (and certain meat and other products from those animals) from Greece into the United States. Because bovine spongiform encephalopathy is considered to exist in Greece, the importation of ruminants and meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that have been in Greece is prohibited.
snip...
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&docid=02-6837-filed
========================
What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from the country?
Very few products that would be of risk for transmission of BSE were imported into the US from Greece during 2000 or 2001 (January - April). Due to the above mentioned import ban, no live ruminants, ruminant meat, meal made from ruminants, or other high risk products from ruminants were imported from Greece during this time period. In 2001 (January - April), 3000 kg of enzymes and prepared enzymes and 5 kg of medicants containing antibiotics for veterinary use were imported. The data do not provide a species of origin code for these products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.
Sources: World Trade Atlas
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?
Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived to US airports in fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from Greece arrived via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 584 air passengers from Greece were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE; most passengers carried from one to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although one passenger in November 1999 carried 23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida, Massachusetts, and New York were the reported destinations of these passengers. None of the passengers with meat items reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm while in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_greece0701.htm
Greetings list members,
i just cannot accept this;
> 23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)
> The data do not provide a species of origin code for these
> products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.
what kind of statement is this?
how stupid do they think we are?
it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Slovenia?
There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000.
APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or ranch in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_slovenia1101.htm
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?
A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights.
As part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238 air passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a total of 17 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_cz0601.htm
What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from Austria?
Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat, animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified species.
Source: World Trade Atlas
snip...
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Austria?
A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria arrived in the US via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air passengers from Austria were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total of 23 kg meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.
Source: US Dept. of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_austria1201.htm
Greetings FDA and public,
if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.
[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]
if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid me.
[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]
more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of these species are capable of carrying a TSE?
snip...
A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_israel0602.htm
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base.
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Japan?
Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air passengers from Japan were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_japan0901.htm
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?
A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural interest. Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE, FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY.
Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_germany1200e.htm
search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/iw_archive.htm
more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';
To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Subject: Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again References: <[log in to unmask]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Virus-Scanner: Found to be clean
Greetings again List Members,
let me kick a madcow around here a bit.
on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding system.
the USDA/APHIS states;
> During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from
> Poland included non-species specific animal products
> used in animal feeds and non-species specific sausage and offal
> products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant product
> imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant
> material.
NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially _cross-contamination_, it states;
ANNEX 1
Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001
EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND STABILITY
The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from 1987 onwards.
This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system and increased over time.
The continuing very high external challenge supported this development.
Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK Heat treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence provided on compliance.
Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in cattle feed.
BSE surveillance:
Not sufficient before 2001.
Cross-contamination:
Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in time and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and growing.
see full text and ANNEX 1 at;
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out185_en.pdf
so in my humble opinion, the statement by the USDA/APHIS that ''these US imports _should_ not have contained ruminant materials, is a joke. a sad joke indeed.
* POLAND BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENT
http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/sc/ssc/out185_en.pdf
BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM $$$
Subject: BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM $$$ Date: November 1, 2002 at 8:03 am PST
[Federal Register: November 1, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 212)]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
9 CFR Part 94
[Docket No. 02-072-2]
Change in Disease Status of Israel Because of BSE
AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.
ACTION: Affirmation of interim rule as final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting as a final rule, without change, an interim rule that amended the regulations by adding Israel to the list of regions where bovine spongiform encephalopathy exists because the disease had been detected in a native-born animal in that region. The effect of the interim rule was a restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule was necessary to help prevent the introduction of bovine spongiform encephalopathy into the United States.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The interim rule became effective on June 4, 2002.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Gary Colgrove, Chief Staff Veterinarian, Sanitary Trade Issues Team, National Center for Import and Export, VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737- 1231; (301) 734-4356.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The regulations in 9 CFR parts 93, 94, 95, and 96 (referred to below as the regulations) govern the importation of certain animals, birds, poultry, meat, other animal products and byproducts, hay, and straw into the United States in order to prevent the introduction of various animal diseases, including bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
In an interim rule effective June 4, 2002, and published in the Federal Register on July 18, 2002 (67 FR 47243-47244, Docket No. 02- 072-1), we amended the regulations in Sec. 94.18 (a)(1) by adding Israel to the list of regions where BSE exists due to the detection of BSE in a native-born animal in that region.
Comments on the interim rule were required to be received on or before September 16, 2002. We did not receive any comments. Therefore, for the reasons given in the interim rule, we are adopting the interim rule as a final rule.
This action also affirms the information contained in the interim rule concerning Executive Orders 12866 and 12988 and the Paperwork Reduction Act.
Further, for this action, the Office of Management and Budget has waived its review under Executive Order 12866.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
This action affirms an interim rule that amended the regulations by adding Israel to the list of regions where BSE exists. The effect of the interim rule was a restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule was necessary to help prevent the introduction of BSE into the United States.
The following analysis addresses the economic effects of the interim rule on small entities, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
The interim rule's restrictions on the importation of ruminants and ruminant products and byproducts from Israel are not expected to have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities due to the fact that the restricted items are either not imported from Israel or are imported in very small amounts. There are three categories of imports that may be affected, but Israel's share of U.S. imports is small in each case.
The first category of affected imported commodities is ``Meat and edible meat offal, salted in brine, dried or smoked; edible flours and meals of meat or meat offal.'' Average total yearly imports of these products by the United States over the 3-year period 1999-2001 were valued at $24.6 million. Imports from Israel in 1999 were valued at $26,000. No imports of these products from Israel were reported for 2000 or 2001.
The second category of affected commodities is ``Preparations of a kind used in animal feeding.'' Average total yearly imports of these products, 1999-2001, were valued at $93.5 million. Imports from Israel had an average yearly value over this period of about $76,000. The final category of affected commodities is ``Other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood.'' Average yearly imports of these products, 1999-2001, were valued at $101.2 million. Imports from Israel had an average yearly value over this period of about $2.7 million. It is apparent that Israel is a minor supplier to the United States of the ruminant products and byproducts affected by the BSE-related restrictions resulting from the interim rule. Therefore, we do not expect that the interim rule's restrictions on ruminants and ruminant products and byproducts from Israel will substantially affect any U.S. importers, large or small, of those commodities.
Under these circumstances, the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has determined that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
List of Subjects in 9 CFR Part 94
Animal diseases, Imports, Livestock, Meat and meat products, Milk, Poultry and poultry products, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
PART 94--RINDERPEST, FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE, FOWL PEST (FOWL PLAGUE), EXOTIC NEWCASTLE DISEASE, AFRICAN SWINE FEVER, HOG CHOLERA, AND BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY: PROHIBITED AND RESTRICTED IMPORTATIONS
Accordingly, we are adopting as a final rule, without change, the interim rule that amended 9 CFR part 94 and that was published at 67 FR 47243-47244 on July 18, 2002.
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 450, 7711-7714, 7751, 7754, 8303, 8306, 8308, 8310, 8311, and 8315; 21 U.S.C 136 and 136a; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 4331 and 4332; 7 CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.4.
Done in Washington, DC, this 28th day of October, 2002. Bobby R. Acord, Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. [FR Doc. 02-27812 Filed 10-31-02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3410-34-P
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002_register&docid=02-27812-filed
greetings List members,
MORE OF THE INFAMOUS USA NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM.
as long as the exporting country and the importing country know not what they are exporting (play dumb/stupid), this non-species coding system allows potential BSE/TSE materials to be imported and exported freely and legally...
TSS
What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from Israel ?
The U.S. imported no live ruminants or ruminant meat from Israel since 1999. In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE. Other imports from Israel during the period 1998-2001 included non-species specific preparations used in animal feeds and other non-food products of unspecified animals. For the category "preparations used in animal feeding, NESOI" that was imported into the U.S., it is possible that bovine meat or bovine byproducts could have been included in this category. However, the US Food and Drug Administration prohibits feeding of meat-and-bone meal to ruminants in the U.S.
HS Code
Description
Unit
1998
1999
2000
2001
Feed - non species specific
Total
45,030
48,000
50,649
43,000
2309909500
Preparations Used in Animal Feedings, NESOI
KG
45,030
48,000
50,649
43,000
Meat & offal- non species specific
Total
5
0
0
0
300110
Dried Organs
KG
5
0
0
0
Other animal products - ruminants
Total
24
0
0
0
3002100040
Fetal Bovine Serum (FBS)
KG
24
0
0
0
Source: World Trade Atlas
What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Israel?
A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.
Under APHIS-PPQ?s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/bse_israel0602.htm
TSS
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Docket Management Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC -254 Accepted - Volume 11
Owens, Julie
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM
To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Page 1 of 98
8/3/2006
Greetings FSIS,
PLANTS, SOIL, TSE, PRION
***>>> Recently, we have been using PMCA to study the role of environmental prion contamination on the horizontal spreading of TSEs. These experiments have focused on the study of the interaction of prions with plants and environmentally relevant surfaces. Our results show that plants (both leaves and roots) bind tightly to prions present in brain extracts and excreta (urine and feces) and retain even small quantities of PrPSc for long periods of time. Strikingly, ingestion of prioncontaminated leaves and roots produced disease with a 100% attack rate and an incubation period not substantially longer than feeding animals directly with scrapie brain homogenate. Furthermore, plants can uptake prions from contaminated soil and transport them to different parts of the plant tissue (stem and leaves). Similarly, prions bind tightly to a variety of environmentally relevant surfaces, including stones, wood, metals, plastic, glass, cement, etc. Prion contaminated surfaces efficiently transmit prion disease when these materials were directly injected into the brain of animals and strikingly when the contaminated surfaces were just placed in the animal cage. These findings demonstrate that environmental materials can efficiently bind infectious prions and act as carriers of infectivity, suggesting that they may play an important role in the horizontal transmission of the disease.
SOURCE PRION CONFERENCE 2015 ABSTRACTS
***> A CASE OF POTENTIAL TSE PRION BILOGICAL WARFARE?
SSG James Alford Update
Tuesday, March 16, 2004
Curby sends an update about SSG James Alford, the Special Forces sergeant that was misdiagnosed when he contracted Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (human Mad Cow disease). I posted about it here and here.
Soldier first to get new 'mad cow' treatment By LEON ALLIGOOD Staff Writer A Green Beret from Fort Campbell has become the first person in the nation to receive a new drug treatment for the human variant of mad cow disease.
Staff Sgt. James Alford, 25, a soldier who was awarded a Bronze Star and deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, is resting at his parents' home in Karnack, Texas, after the first round of treatments.
His mother, Gail Alford, said it's too early to note any changes, but the family watches him closely.
''His eyes are open. He recognizes us and laughs at us. He still likes to watch movies and listen to country music. We'll take it day by day,'' she said.
Doctors hope the new treatment will stall or perhaps reverse effects of the brain-wasting Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. If so, it would be the first treatment to give hope to CJD victims, who usually die within a year of diagnosis...
It's a miracle and a testament to his strength that he is even alive. Please keep Staff Sergeant Alford, and his wife and family in your thoughts and prayers.
Posted by Blackfive on Tuesday, March 16, 2004 at 03:26 PM |
SNIP...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. said... Misdiagnosed Green Beret demoted Soldier nearly court-martialed before rare brain illness revealed KARNACK, Texas, Nov. 24 - By the time he shipped out for the war in Iraq in January, Special Forces Sgt. James Alford was a wreck of a soldier. For five months, he had been doing odd things. He disappeared from Fort Campbell, Ky., for several days last year. He lost equipment and lied to superiors. In December, he was demoted from staff sergeant to sergeant.
In the Kwaitidesert, he came apart. The hotshot Green Beret who a year earlier ran circles around his team members and earned a Bronze Star in Afghanistan was ordered to carry a notepad to remember orders. By March, he was being cited for dereliction of duty, larceny and lying to superiors. He couldn’t even keep up with his gas mask.
Finally, in April, his commanders had had enough. They ordered him to return to Fort Campbell to be court-martialed and kicked out of the Special Forces.
Story continues below ↓ “Your conduct is inconsistent with the integrity and professionalism required by a Special Forces soldier,” Lt. Col. Christopher E. Conner of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group Headquarters in Kuwait, wrote April 10.
Confused and disgraced Confused and disgraced, the soldier moved back into his off-base home where he ate canned meat and anchovies, unaware of the day, the month or the year.
Sensing something was wrong, a neighbor called Alford’s parents. They drove 600 miles from East Texas to find a son who’d lost 30 pounds and could no longer drink from a glass, use a telephone, button his shirt or say Amber, the name of his soldier wife who was still stationed in the Middle East.
Staff Sgt. James Alford, a U.S. Army Green Beret, poses in this family photo in Karnack, Texas.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
They rushed him to an emergency room. A month and several hospitals later, Alford’s family learned he was dying of a disease eating away his brain. He had Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, an extremely rare and fatal degenerative brain disorder akin to mad cow disease that causes rapid, progressive dementia.
Now, as the 25-year-old soldier wastes away in his boyhood home, his parents and his wife are struggling to understand how the military could have misdiagnosed Alford’s erratic, forgetful behavior as nothing more than the symptoms of a sloppy, incompetent soldier.
“He had to hold his hands to keep them from shaking, but they saw nothing wrong with my child,” his mother Gail Alford, a nine-year Army veteran, said recently from her home in a rural community near Marshall, Texas.
Alford’s parents say Special Forces staff told them that a doctor in Kuwait found nothing wrong with him and that a psychiatrist there had said Alford was “faking it.”
Family wants formal apology Army officials have acknowledged that the 5th Special Forces Group erred and, more than eight months after Alford’s demotion, they reinstated his staff sergeant rank.
‘They called him stupid, told him he was lazy, he was a liar, that he wasn’t any good, that he was a faker. I want them shamed the way they shamed my son.’
— GAIL ALFORD
But the dying soldier’s family wants more. They want a public apology for the ridicule and disgrace that they say filled Alford’s final days of service.
“They called him stupid, told him he was lazy, he was a liar, that he wasn’t any good, that he was a faker,” his mother said, recalling what little her son could tell her about his time in Kuwait. “I want them shamed the way they shamed my son.”
And they want his pay restored and his medical benefits maintained. The Army declared Alford medically incompetent, placed him on retirement status and froze his pay earlier this month until his parents can prove in court they are his legal guardians. His mother said she was given power of attorney long ago.
Alford’s father, retired Army Command Sgt. Maj. John Alford, who served 34 years, said Army doctors have been caring and professional, and commanders stationed his son’s wife, Army Spc. Amber Alford, in Texas near her husband.
He mainly faults the Special Forces.
“I think they did everything they could to break him, mentally and physically,” he said.
A Special Forces spokesman did not respond to phone messages and an e-mail request for an interview with The Associated Press.
In a July 30 letter responding to an inquiry by U.S. Rep. Max Sandlin of Texas, Army Lt. Col. Johan C. Haraldsen wrote that the Special Forces group to which Alford belonged expressed “its deepest concerns” to the soldier and his family.
“All actions taken ... involving Sergeant Alford were appropriate based on the best information available at that time,” Haraldsen wrote.
Alford himself may have tried to conceal his symptoms, said Dr. Steve J. Williams, a clinical fellow in the Division of Infectious Diseases at Vanderbilt University Medical Center in Nashville, Tenn.
“He was capable of masking the symptoms because he was resourceful and he was a smart guy,” said Williams, who diagnosed Alford with CJD. “I’d ask him what floor he was on and I could catch him looking outside and counting the number of windows.”
Classis form of CJD? Doctors believe he has the classic form of the disease, which develops spontaneously. It affects just one in 100 million people under 30, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Col. David Dooley, an infectious disease doctor at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, said Special Forces staff shouldn’t take the blame for missing Alford’s illness. A delayed diagnosis is “typical and classic;” the average lag time for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is five to seven months, he said.
“If I’m going to hold anything against them, they might have come around a little faster when a medical problem was recognized,” Dooley said. “The Special Forces group was fairly inert to the face of data that we medics were showing them.”
Alford’s parents believe he has the “variant” form of CJD, caused by eating brains or nervous system tissue from an infected cow. They worry he may have got it from eating sheep brains locals served to soldiers as an honor in Oman two years ago.
But there is no evidence people can get the disease from sheep.
Doctors also note Alford didn’t have the outbursts of anger and depression usually associated with the variant form of the disease, and his illness has progressed at the faster rate resembling the classic form.
Awarded the bronze star Alford was the youngest man in 5th Group and his wife says some of his team members resented his promotion. At least one team member said Alford seemed a bit immature and made a few bad decisions when he first joined, but he earned decorations, military records show.
He was awarded the Bronze Star in May 2002 for “gallant conduct” in leading reconnaissance patrols in Kandahar and helping capture suspected Iranian terrorists.
Staff Sgt. Miguel Fabbiani, a friend of Alford’s and a member of the same team based at Fort Campbell, said Alford’s symptoms escalated during wartime when he was working with a new group that didn’t know him as well. And people remembered past youthful errors.
Alford’s parents said they didn’t see him enough to detect a problem. His wife was stationed near him for a while in Kuwait, but she chalked up his odd behavior to stress.
Alford’s father said the actions of his son’s superiors broke the spirit of a young man who had wanted to become a soldier since he was 4.
He now lies in pastel sheets next to a wall painting of John Wayne. Wearing a Houston Texans T-shirt that hangs like a hospital gown, he stares absently into a TV that glows 24 hours, his hands gripping stuffed animals to keep them from clenching shut.
“He knows his name, sometimes,” says his wife, a tiny woman in sneakers who helps tend to her husband as she ponders a life alone. “Sometimes I’ll go up to him, wink at him and make kissy faces and he laughs.”
‘He will lose everything' Her eyes well up as she remembers the handsome, arrogant boy she met as a teenager at a barrel racing contest in Texas.
As his brain deteriorates, his organs will fail.
“He will go blind, he will go deaf, he will lose everything,” his father says.
He stopped walking more than a month ago, mumbles when he tries to speak, is fed intravenously and takes medicine for insomnia, pain and tremors. Doctors have told the family he probably won’t live to see Christmas.
The Army told the family the issues over Alford’s pay could be resolved within weeks, but the family is skeptical. They aren’t sure how they will pay his bills and maintain his 24-hour care without his salary.
“It’s very sad when the people who are putting their life on the line for this country should be treated like this,” Alford’s father said. “This has been a bureaucratic nightmare. We’ve got enough to deal with on a daily basis, caring after our son and dealing with our pain and weariness and our suffering to have to fight the U.S. Army.”
They fought for four months before his rank was reinstated in September.
John Alford knew his son might not live long enough to get the good news, so he had already told him a “white lie” that he had been vindicated.
“It was very important to him because he kept saying, ‘I didn’t do anything wrong, Daddy.”’
© 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3541410/
VETERANS FOR PEACE Veterans Working Together for Peace & Justice Through Non-violence. Wage Peace!
Green Beret nearly court-martialed before rare disease found
By Lisa Falkenberg The Associated Press Nov 23, 2003
KARNACK, Texas -- By the time he shipped out for the war in Iraq in January, Special Forces Sgt. James Alford was a wreck of a soldier.
For five months, he had been doing odd things.
He had disappeared from Fort Campbell, Ky., for several days.
He lost equipment and lied to superiors.
In December, he was demoted from staff sergeant to sergeant.
In the Kuwaiti desert, he came apart.
The hotshot Green Beret who a year earlier ran circles around his team members and was recommended for a Bronze Star in Afghanistan was ordered to carry a notepad to remember orders.
By March, he was being cited for dereliction of duty, larceny and lying to superiors.
He couldn't even keep track of his gas mask.
Finally, in April, his commanders had had enough.
They ordered him to return to Fort Campbell to be court-martialed and kicked out of the Special Forces.
"Your conduct is inconsistent with the integrity and professionalism required by a Special Forces soldier," Lt. Col. Christopher Conner of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group Headquarters in Kuwait, wrote April 10. Confused and disgraced, the soldier moved back into his off-base home where he ate canned meat and anchovies, unaware of the day, the month or the year.
Sensing something was wrong, a neighbor called Alford's parents.
They drove 600 miles from east Texas to find a son who had lost 30 pounds and could no longer drink from a glass, use a telephone, button his shirt or say "Amber," the name of his soldier wife.
They rushed him to an emergency room.
A month and several hospitals later, Alford's family learned he was dying of a disease eating away his brain.
He had Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, an extremely rare and fatal degenerative brain disorder akin to mad cow disease that causes rapid, progressive dementia.
Now, as the 25-year-old soldier wastes away in his boyhood home, his parents and his wife are struggling to understand how the military could have misdiagnosed Alford's erratic behavior as nothing more than the symptoms of a sloppy, incompetent soldier.
"He had to hold his hands to keep them from shaking, but they saw nothing wrong with my child," his mother, Gail Alford, a nine-year Army veteran, said recently from her home near Marshall, Texas.
Alford's parents say Special Forces staff told them that a doctor in Kuwait found nothing wrong with him and that a psychiatrist there had said Alford was "faking it."
Army officials have acknowledged that the 5th Special Forces Group erred and, more than eight months after Alford's demotion, they reinstated his staff sergeant rank.
But the dying soldier's family wants more.
They want a public apology for the ridicule and disgrace that they say filled Alford's final days of service.
"They called him stupid, told him he was lazy, he was a liar, that he wasn't any good, that he was a faker," his mother said, recalling what little her son could tell her about his time in Kuwait.
"I want them shamed the way they shamed my son."
And they want his pay restored and his medical benefits maintained.
The Army declared Alford medically incompetent, placed him on retirement status and froze his pay until his parents can prove in court they are his legal guardians.
His mother said she was given power of attorney long ago.
Army officials say they are just following procedures intended to protect soldiers.
Alford's father, retired Army Command Sgt. Maj. John Alford, who served 34 years, said Army doctors have been caring and professional, and commanders stationed his son's wife, Army Spc. Amber Alford, in Texas near her husband.
He mainly faults the Special Forces: "They did everything they could to break him, mentally and physically."
Maj. Robert Gowan, a spokesman for Army Special Forces Command, said 5th Group is saddened by the soldier's disease and regretful that it wasn't diagnosed sooner, but that a public apology may not be appropriate.
"This disease was not caused by 5th Group and the regret they express is in regards to the tragedy," Gowan said Wednesday, adding that the unit "acted on the information they had available at the time. If everyone would have known that Sgt. Alford was sick, things might have been handled differently."
Alford himself may have tried to conceal his symptoms, said Steve Williams, a clinical fellow in the Division of Infectious Diseases at Vanderbilt University Medical Center in Nashville, Tenn. "He was capable of masking the symptoms because he was resourceful," said Williams, who diagnosed Alford with CJD. "I'd ask him what floor he was on and I could catch him looking outside and counting the number of windows."
Doctors believe he has the classic form of the disease, which develops spontaneously. It affects just one in 100 million people under 30, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Col. David Dooley, an infectious disease doctor at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, said Special Forces staff shouldn't take the blame for missing Alford's illness.
A delayed diagnosis is "typical and classic"; the average lag time for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is five to seven months, he said. "If I'm going to hold anything against them, they might have come around a little faster when a medical problem was recognized," Dooley said.
Alford's parents believe he has the "variant" form of CJD, caused by eating brains or nervous system tissue from an infected cow. They worry he may have got it from eating sheep brains locals served to soldiers as an honor in Oman in 2001. But there is no evidence people can get the disease from sheep.
Doctors also note Alford didn't have the outbursts of anger and depression usually associated with the variant form of the disease, and his illness has progressed at the faster rate resembling the classic form.
He now lies in pastel sheets next to a wall painting of John Wayne. Wearing a Houston Texans T-shirt that hangs like a hospital gown, he stares absently into a TV that glows 24 hours, his hands gripping stuffed animals to keep them from clenching shut.
"He knows his name, sometimes," says his wife, who helps tend to her husband as she ponders a life alone. Her eyes well up as she remembers the handsome, arrogant boy she met as a teenager at a barrel racing contest in Texas.
The Army told the family the issues over Alford's pay could be resolved within weeks, but the family is skeptical. "It's very sad when the people who are putting their life on the line for this country should be treated like this," Alford's father said.
Sgt. James Alford: They Finally Did the Right Thing
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
December 11, 2003
[Have an opinion about the views expressed in this article? Sound off in the Hot Issues with Defensewatch Forum.]
By Robert G. Williscroft
2003-------- Original Message --------2003
Subject: [CJDVoice] Re: SPECIAL FORCES WAR HERO DYING HIDEOS DEATH AFTER BEING DEMOTED (AKA MAD COW DISEASE)
Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2003 14:21:34 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: cjdvoice@YAHOOGROUPS.COM
To: OREILLY@FOXNEWS.COM CC: CJDVOICE
References: <3FC22F84.6040305@wt.net>
Hello again Bill,
I heard you ran a story last night on our war hero and CJD and what the Gov. did to him. I want to thank you, We all want to thank you. I am sorry to say I missed the show. Is there any transcript of the show we can locate on the www (url)? if so I would very much like to read it. again, many many thanks. BUT, there are many more out there that the Gov. is refusing to acknowledge. I only hope that you continue to pursuit and keep a close eye on this issue of human/animal TSEs aka mad cow disease in the USA, _especially_ the sporadic CJDs and the continued denial and flat refusal to rapid test USA cattle for TSEs and to refuse to make CJD reportable Nationally ASAP...
again, many thanks,
I am sincerely,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. wrote:
------ Original Message --------
Subject: SPECIAL FORCES WAR HERO DYING HIDEOS DEATH AFTER BEING DEMOTED (AKA MAD COW DISEASE)
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2003 10:19:16 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: OREILLY@FOXNEWS.COM
> Hey Bill, maybe you can help this family out. After this soldier being a
> special forces war hero, and then left to die a most hideous death,
> this is not right. Another thing, this is a 25 year old dying from
> sporadic CJD. > please do not let the Government confuse you with the myth that
> sporadic CJD just falls from the sky with no route and source. This is
> total crap......please help this family;
> > Family of dying GI battles bureaucracy
> > Associated Press
> > > KARNACK - By the time he shipped out for the war in Iraq in January,
> Special Forces Sgt. James Alford was a wreck of a soldier.
> > For five months, he had been doing odd things. He disappeared from
> Fort Campbell, Ky., for several days. He lost equipment and lied to
> superiors. In December, he was demoted from staff sergeant to sergeant.
> > In the Kuwaiti desert, he came apart. The hotshot Green Beret, who a
> year earlier ran circles around his team members and earned a Bronze
> Star in Afghanistan, was ordered to carry a notepad to remember
> orders. By March, he was being cited for dereliction of duty, larceny
> and lying to superiors. He couldn't even keep up with his gas mask.
> > Finally, in April, his commanders had had enough. They ordered him to
> return to Fort Campbell to be court-martialed and kicked out of the
> Special Forces. >
> "Your conduct is inconsistent with the integrity and professionalism
> required by a Special Forces soldier," Lt. Col. Christopher Conner of
> the 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group Headquarters in Kuwait
> wrote April 10.
> > Confused and disgraced, the soldier moved back into his off-base home,
> where he ate canned meat and anchovies, unaware of the day, the month
> or the year.
> > Sensing something was wrong, a neighbor called Alford's parents. They
> drove 600 miles from East Texas to find a son who had lost 30 pounds
> and could no longer drink from a glass, use a telephone, button his
> shirt or say "Amber," the name of his soldier wife, who was still
> stationed in the Middle East.
> > They rushed him to an emergency room. A month and several hospitals
> later, Alford's family learned that he was dying of a disease eating
> away his brain. He had Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, an extremely rare
> and fatal degenerative brain disorder akin to mad cow disease that
> causes rapid, progressive dementia.
> > Now, as the 25-year-old soldier wastes away in his boyhood home, his
> parents and his wife are struggling to understand how the military
> could have misdiagnosed Alford's erratic, forgetful behavior as
> nothing more than the symptoms of a sloppy, incompetent soldier.
> > "He had to hold his hands to keep them from shaking, but they saw
> nothing wrong with my child," his mother, Gail Alford, a nine-year
> Army veteran, said recently from her home in Karnack, a rural
> community near Marshall.
> > Alford's parents say Special Forces staff members told them that a
> doctor in Kuwait had found nothing wrong with him and that a
> psychiatrist there had said Alford was "faking it."
> > Army officials have acknowledged that the 5th Special Forces Group
> erred and, more than eight months after Alford's demotion, they
> reinstated his staff sergeant rank.
> > But the dying soldier's family members want more. They want a public
> apology for the ridicule and disgrace that they say filled Alford's
> final days of service.
> > "They called him stupid, told him he was lazy, he was a liar, that he
> wasn't any good, that he was a faker," his mother said, recalling what
> little her son could tell her about his time in Kuwait. "I want them
> shamed the way they shamed my son."
> > And they want his pay restored and his medical benefits maintained.
> The Army declared Alford medically incompetent, placed him on
> retirement status and froze his pay this month until his parents can
> prove in court that they are his legal guardians. His mother said she
> was given power of attorney long ago.
> > Special Forces blamed Alford's father, retired Army Command Sgt. Maj. John Alford, who
> served 34 years, said that Army doctors have been caring and
> professional and that commanders stationed his son's wife, Spc. Amber
> Alford, in Texas near her husband.
> > He mainly faults the Special Forces.
> > "I think they did everything they could to break him, mentally and
> physically," he said.
> > A Special Forces spokesman did not respond to phone messages and an
> e-mail request for an interview with The Associated Press.
> > In a July 30 letter responding to an inquiry by U.S. Rep. Max Sandlin,
> D-Marshall, Army Lt. Col. Johan Haraldsen wrote that the Special
> Forces group to which Alford belonged expressed "its deepest concerns"
> to the soldier and his family.
> > "All actions taken ... involving Sergeant Alford were appropriate
> based on the best information available at that time," Haraldsen wrote.
> > Alford himself may have tried to conceal his symptoms, said Dr. Steve
> Williams, a clinical fellow in the division of infectious diseases at
> Vanderbilt University Medical Center in Nashville, Tenn.
> > "He was capable of masking the symptoms because he was resourceful and
> he was a smart guy," said Williams, who diagnosed Alford with
> Creutzfeldt-Jakob. "I'd ask him what floor he was on, and I could
> catch him looking outside and counting the number of windows."
> > Doctors believe that Alford has the classic form of the disease, which
> develops spontaneously. It affects one in 100 million people under 30,
> according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
> > Col. David Dooley, an infectious-disease doctor at Brooke Army Medical
> Center in San Antonio, said Special Forces staff members shouldn't
> take the blame for missing Alford's illness. A delayed diagnosis is
> "typical and classic"; the average lag time for the disease is five to
> seven months, he said.
> > "If I'm going to hold anything against them, they might have come
> around a little faster when a medical problem was recognized," Dooley
> said. "The Special Forces group was fairly inert to the face of data
> that we medics were showing them."
> > Alford's parents believe that he has the variant form of the disease,
> caused by eating brains or nervous-system tissue from an infected cow.
> They worry that he may have gotten it from eating sheep brains locals
> served to soldiers as an honor in Oman two years ago.
> > But there is no evidence that people can get the disease from sheep.
> > Doctors also note that Alford didn't have the outbursts of anger and
> depression usually associated with the variant form and that the fast
> progression of his illness is more consistent with the classic form.
> > Losing everything
> > Alford was the youngest man in the 5th Special Forces Group, and his
> wife says some of his team members resented his promotion. At least
> one said Alford seemed a bit immature and made a few bad decisions
> when he first joined, but military records show that he earned
> decorations.
> > He was awarded the Bronze Star in May 2002 for "gallant conduct" in
> leading reconnaissance patrols in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar
> and helping capture Iranian terrorism suspects.
> > Staff Sgt. Miguel Fabbiani, a friend of Alford's and a member of the
> same team based at Fort Campbell, said Alford's symptoms escalated
> during wartime when he was working with a new group that didn't know
> him as well.
> > Alford's parents said they didn't see him enough to detect a problem.
> His wife was stationed near him for a while in Kuwait, but she chalked
> up his odd behavior to stress.
> > Alford's father said the actions of his son's superiors broke the
> spirit of a young man who had wanted to become a soldier since he was 4.
> > He now lies in pastel sheets next to a wall painting of John Wayne.
> Wearing a Houston Texans T-shirt that hangs like a hospital gown, he
> stares absently into a television that glows 24 hours, his hands
> gripping stuffed animals to keep them from clenching shut.
> > "He knows his name, sometimes," says his wife, a tiny woman in
> sneakers who helps tend to her husband as she ponders a life alone.
> "Sometimes I'll go up to him, wink at him and make kissy faces, and he
> laughs."
> > Her eyes well up as she remembers the handsome, arrogant boy she met
> as a teen-ager at a barrel-racing contest in Texas.
> > As his brain deteriorates, his organs will fail.
> > "He will go blind, he will go deaf, he will lose everything," his
> father said.
> > He stopped walking more than a month ago, mumbles when he tries to
> speak, is fed intravenously and takes medicine for insomnia, pain and
> tremors. Doctors have told the family that he probably won't live to
> see Christmas.
> > The Army has said that the issues over Alford's pay could be resolved
> within weeks, but the family members are skeptical. They aren't sure
> how they will pay his bills and maintain his 24-hour care without his
> salary.
> > "It's very sad when the people who are putting their life on the line
> for this country should be treated like this," Alford's father said.
> "This has been a bureaucratic nightmare. We've got enough to deal with
> on a daily basis, caring after our son and dealing with our pain and
> weariness and our suffering to have to fight the U.S. Army."
> > They fought for four months before his rank was reinstated in September.
> > John Alford knew his son might not live long enough to get the good
> news, so he had already told him a "white lie" that he had been
> vindicated.
> > "It was very important to him because he kept saying, 'I didn't do
> anything wrong, Daddy.' "
> > > > http://sierratimes.com/03/11/23/ap_gi_battle.htm
> > > just what is sporadic CJD ??? > > > >
>> It apparently arises from a one-in-a-million spontaneous conversion
>> of a normal cellular protein (encoded by a gene on chromosome 20)
>> into an abnormal 3-dimensional shape, or configuration.
> > > > WRONG, THIS HAS NEVER BEEN PROVEN !!!
> > 85% OF ALL CJDs, ''SPORADIC'' DO NOT JUST HAPPEN WITHOUT
> ROUTE AND SOURCE, THIS IS ONLY A MYTH. please read the data
> below, if you are seeking the truth.
> > there are new findings that dispute this. why does the USA ignore
> these findings?
> i thought i might share this with you. please see below;
SNIP...END
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [Fwd: [CJDVoice] Re: SPECIAL FORCES WAR HERO DYING HIDEOS DEATH AFTER BEING DEMOTED (AKA MAD COW DISEASE)]
Date: Sat, 06 Dec 2003 16:05:48 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Friday, December 05, 2003
This is a partial transcript from The O'Reilly Factor, December 4, 2003.
Watch The O'Reilly Factor weeknights at 8 p.m. and 11 p.m. ET and listen to the Radio Factor!
BILL O'REILLY, HOST: In the Personal Story segment tonight, the tragic saga of 25-year-old Green Beret James Alford.
In 2001, the staff sergeant was assigned duty in the country of Oman, and, while there, he ate a traditional dinner of goat brains.
About a year later, Alford's behavior began to get bizarre, and he was demoted in rank. Despite that, the Army deployed him to Iraq in January 2003, but his health continued to decline, as did his behavior.
Finally, in April 2003, he was sent to Fort Campbell in Kentucky to be court-martialed and kicked out of the Special Forces. But, while there, doctors made a startling discovery. James Alford had mad cow disease, which causes progressive dementia. His brain was literally being eaten away.
The Army then declared Alford medically incompetent and began processing his retirement. They also reinstated his rank.
But his family says there are still problems. What a mess.
Joining us now from Dallas are the parents of Staff Sergeant Alford, retired Sergeant Major John Alford and his wife, Gail. Also, from Boston, Fox News Military Analyst Colonel David Hunt. Sergeant Alford, first, we want to ask you about James. How's he doing right now?
SGT. MAJ. JOHN ALFORD, FATHER OF GREEN BERET: He's about the same that he has been lately. He's not doing any better. He's sleeping quite a bit more. Sometimes he sleeps by day and stays awake all night, but we've just adjusted to that.
O'REILLY: All right. Can you carry on a conversation with him? Is he lucid?
JOHN ALFORD: No, sir. We talk to him. We talk to him just as if he was coherent, and I think he hears us, but he cannot answer us. He cannot communicate in any way.
O'REILLY: All right. So he's in like a vegetative state here, that you have to care for him, feed him, and all of that?
JOHN ALFORD: Yes, sir. He's fed through a tube, but he does take some foods orally, baby foods, and some foods that we process ourselves.
O'REILLY: All right. So he's in bed all the time.
JOHN ALFORD: Yes, sir.
O'REILLY: You have to take care of him, make sure he's alive. Now this is not going to change, right? You can't turn this around, correct?
JOHN ALFORD: No, sir. As far as we know, we cannot.
O'REILLY: All right. Now, Mrs. Alford, what do you want to see happen here?
GAIL ALFORD, MOTHER OF GREEN BERET: I want my son to remain on active duty until his death, and I want his durable power of attorney that he initiated for me prior to being deployed to be honored by the Army.
O'REILLY: What does that mean, though, in concrete terms for you?
GAIL ALFORD: In concrete terms, I want them to fully reinstate his pay and to honor it completely.
O'REILLY: All right, but his rank has been reinstated. I assume he's gotten the back pay that he...
JOHN ALFORD: No.
O'REILLY: No? He hasn't gotten the back pay yet?
GAIL ALFORD: No.
JOHN ALFORD: No. They took him back to his E-6 -- his staff sergeant pay grade, but they're still processing and working on his back pay, and we assume it will be forthcoming.
O'REILLY: Yes, the Army tells us it will be.
JOHN ALFORD: Yes.
O'REILLY: So I wouldn't worry about the financial end of it.
JOHN ALFORD: Yes, but what we're concerned with now -- his pay has been frozen, and it was released temporarily pending my wife being appointed guardian, and then they're only going to pay 80 percent of his pay.
O'REILLY: All right.
JOHN ALFORD: He's an American soldier and he's entitled to it.
O'REILLY: You're right. Got it. You think that he was wounded in the line of duty because, you know, you eat this stuff over in a country where you're posted, so he should get full pay until he's deceased?
JOHN ALFORD: Yes, sir.
O'REILLY: All right.
JOHN ALFORD: And medical benefits.
O'REILLY: And medical benefits. Well, we assume that the V.A. is taking care of him, are they not?
JOHN ALFORD: Well, sir, they would. We want our son to be provided the best medical care available, and we would like to see that either in a military medical facility, not a V.A. hospital, but a military medical facility or a commercial hospital. If he is retired as they're trying to do, he can be treated in a civilian facility, but they will only pay 80 percent of it.
O'REILLY: Eighty percent of it, all right.
JOHN ALFORD: Yes, sir.
O'REILLY: Now, Colonel Hunt, you're heard this terrible story. I mean everybody watching it now -- this poor guy goes over there, and, through no fault of his own, I mean, what is he, 27, 28 years old.
COL. DAVID HUNT (RET.), U.S. ARMY: Twenty-five.
O'REILLY: Well, I think that was when he was -- OK.
JOHN ALFORD: No, sir. He celebrated his 25th birthday three Sundays ago.
O'REILLY: All right. So he's 25 -- geez, just 25 years old. Amazing. So, anyway, he's going to die. And, you know, what do you do? What should the Army do here?
HUNT: This the worst case of abuse of a soldier I've seen in 30 years.
O'REILLY: Really?
HUNT: I have never seen, heard, read, dreamed that the United States Army, that this Special Forces group that I'm a proud member of, a historic unit, would treat another human being, a soldier, a Special Forces soldier like this. The last thing this great kid remembers is the Army called him a liar.
What they've got to do is get the chief of staff of the Army -- this has got to happen fast. He doesn't have a lot of time. His parents -- his mother -- his father is a 34-year veteran of the military, his mother is a nine-year veteran in the military, and his wife is a three-year veteran.
The power of attorney is so stupid, they deployed over in Iraq together, so they had to have a power of attorney with somebody else.
The Army has made a mistake every step of the way. This guy made staff sergeant in five years. It takes normally seven to 10 years.
He got sick, by the way, not at Fort Campbell, but trying out for Delta Force. Besides SEAL Team 6, the Army's Delta Force, the premier counter-terrorism unit in the world. That's the kind of guy he is, four-time volunteer, Bronze Star medal-winner in Afghanistan, goes to Iraq, and they treat him like dirt.
And they're still doing it to his family. This is the biggest outrage I have ever heard of in 30 years.
O'REILLY: So we need to contact the head of the Army right now, right?
HUNT: They ought to get this fixed. There's a great guy who's a deputy commander at 5th Special Forces group, who heard about this in the paper.
This wouldn't have been done without Fox News and The O'Reilly Factor doing this and some local papers writing about it. And they need rank to push this fast.
It's got to be fixed immediately, it will take about a four-star general, pick up the phone, talk to this man's family, 34-year veteran father, a sergeant major, and a nine-year veteran mother and fix it now. O'REILLY: All right. Well, we can make that happen. I think we can make that happen. So he should get full back pay right away, and he should get into the best medical facility the government can provide and they should pay 100 percent of it, right?
HUNT: Absolutely. Absolutely. And they can do that, exceptions, it doesn't matter, take care of this guy now.
O'REILLY: All right. And that would be OK with you folks if we get your full pay coming in and then the best medical facility the government can provide a hundred-percent paid?
JOHN ALFORD: Sir, that's what we're asking for, that and respect and honor the power of attorney, not just for my son, but if he's having this problem, we're having this problem -- we're losing people every day in Iraq, and there's got to be a lot of other families having the same trouble and don't know what to do about it.
O'REILLY: All right. Well, let's work on this first, and then we'll get to the other problem.
All right. Well, we're going to work with Colonel Hunt, and we're going to try to get a definitive word by Monday. You know, we'll give the Army a little time to cut through the bureaucracy, but I think we'll work it out. I really do, and if we don't...
HUNT: I do, too.
O'REILLY: Yes. If we don't it ain't going to be good. All right. Mr. and Mrs. Alford, we want you to have a very merry Christmas, and we're very sad that this happened to your son.
HUNT: God bless the family.
O'REILLY: And we will try to do everything we can for you. And, Colonel, as always, we appreciate it.
And we'll have an update on Monday about this situation
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,105003,00.html
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
Alford's parents believe he has the "variant" form of CJD, caused by eating brains or nervous system tissue from an infected cow. They worry he may have got it from eating sheep brains locals served to soldiers as an honor in Oman two years ago.
But there is no evidence people can get the disease from sheep.
SATURDAY, DECEMBER 06, 2008
Green Beret James Alford is buried with full honors
ZOONOSIS SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE
O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases).
Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***
===============
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
==============
https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf
***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases).
Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***
===============
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
==============
https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf
***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20
PRION 2016 TOKYO
Saturday, April 23, 2016
SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016
Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online
Taylor & Francis
Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts
WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential
Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20
Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period)
*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.
*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.
*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=313160
1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8
Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.
Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.
Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.
snip...
The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
PMID: 6997404
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract
Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"
Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.
snip...
76/10.12/4.6
Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.
Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).
Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.
Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0
Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)
C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK
National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland
SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
IN CONFIDENCE
SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES
IN CONFIDENCE
2020
2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains
PLEASE NOTE;
2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains
Olivier Andreoletti, INRA Research Director, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), invited speaker, presented the results of two recently published scientific articles of interest, of which he is co-author: ‘Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice’ (MarinMoreno et al., 2020) and ‘The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie’ (Huor et al., 2019).
In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE.
***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <***
SUNDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2020
Bovine adapted transmissible mink encephalopathy is similar to L-BSE after passage through sheep with the VRQ/VRQ genotype but not VRQ/ARQ
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2020
The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/ Nor98 scrapie
APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission
June 17, 2019
June 17, 2019
APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission
Greetings APHIS et al,
I would kindly like to comment on APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], and my comments are as follows, with the latest peer review and transmission studies as references of evidence.
THE OIE/USDA BSE Minimal Risk Region MRR is nothing more than free pass to import and export the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease. December 2003, when the USDA et al lost it's supposedly 'GOLD CARD' ie BSE FREE STATUS (that was based on nothing more than not looking and not finding BSE), once the USA lost it's gold card BSE Free status, the USDA OIE et al worked hard and fast to change the BSE Geographical Risk Statuses i.e. the BSE GBR's, and replaced it with the BSE MRR policy, the legal tool to trade mad cow type disease TSE Prion Globally. The USA is doing just what the UK did, when they shipped mad cow disease around the world, except with the BSE MRR policy, it's now legal.
Also, the whole concept of the BSE MRR policy is based on a false pretense, that atypical BSE is not transmissible, and that only typical c-BSE is transmissible via feed. This notion that atypical BSE TSE Prion is an old age cow disease that is not infectious is absolutely false, there is NO science to show this, and on the contrary, we now know that atypical BSE will transmit by ORAL ROUTES, but even much more concerning now, recent science has shown that Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion in deer and elk which is rampant with no stopping is sight in the USA, and Scrapie TSE Prion in sheep and goat, will transmit to PIGS by oral routes, this is our worst nightmare, showing even more risk factors for the USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban.
The FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban has failed terribly bad, and is still failing, since August 1997. there is tonnage and tonnage of banned potential mad cow feed that went into commerce, and still is, with one decade, 10 YEARS, post August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban, 2007, with 10,000,000 POUNDS, with REASON, Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. you can see all these feed ban warning letters and tonnage of mad cow feed in commerce, year after year, that is not accessible on the internet anymore like it use to be, you can see history of the FDA failure August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban here, but remember this, we have a new outbreak of TSE Prion disease in a new livestock species, the camel, and this too is very worrisome.
WITH the OIE and the USDA et al weakening the global TSE prion surveillance, by not classifying the atypical Scrapie as TSE Prion disease, and the notion that they want to do the same thing with typical scrapie and atypical BSE, it's just not scientific.
WE MUST abolish the BSE MRR policy, go back to the BSE GBR risk assessments by country, and enhance them to include all strains of TSE Prion disease in all species. With Chronic Wasting CWD TSE Prion disease spreading in Europe, now including, Norway, Finland, Sweden, also in Korea, Canada and the USA, and the TSE Prion in Camels, the fact the the USA is feeding potentially CWD, Scrapie, BSE, typical and atypical, to other animals, and shipping both this feed and or live animals or even grains around the globe, potentially exposed or infected with the TSE Prion. this APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], under it's present definition, does NOT show the true risk of the TSE Prion in any country. as i said, it's nothing more than a legal tool to trade the TSE Prion around the globe, nothing but ink on paper.
AS long as the BSE MRR policy stays in effect, TSE Prion disease will continued to be bought and sold as food for both humans and animals around the globe, and the future ramifications from friendly fire there from, i.e. iatrogenic exposure and transmission there from from all of the above, should not be underestimated. ...
Comment from Terry Singeltary
Posted by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service on Jun 19, 2019
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2020
***> REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES Paris, 9–13 September 2019 BSE, TSE, PRION
see updated concerns with atypical BSE from feed and zoonosis...terry
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 1, 2020 USDA OIE BSE TSE PRION FDA PART 589 BSE TSE PRION aka MAD COW FEED BAN Failure 2020 UPDATE
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 2020
BSE research project final report 2005 to 2008 SE1796 SID5
I URGE EVERYONE TO READ IN FULL, THE OIE REPORT 2019 ABOUT ATYPICAL BSE TSE PRION, SRMs, SBOs, and feed...tss
''Experts could not rule out other causes due to the difficulty of investigating individual cases. Some constraints are the long incubation period of the disease and the lack of detailed information available from farms at the time of the trace-back investigation.''
Scientists investigate origin of isolated BSE cases
The European response to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) after the crisis of the 1980s has significantly reduced prevalence of the disease in cattle. However, isolated cases are still being reported in the EU and for this reason the European Commission asked EFSA to investigate their origin.
The key measure for controlling BSE in the EU is a ban on the use of animal proteins in livestock feed. This is because BSE can be transmitted to cattle through contaminated feed, mainly in the first year of life.
Sixty cases of classical BSE have been reported in cattle born after the EU ban was enforced in 2001. None of these animals entered the food chain. Classical BSE is the type of BSE transmissible to humans. The Commission asked EFSA to determine if these cases were caused by contaminated feed or whether they occurred spontaneously, i.e. without an apparent cause.
EFSA experts concluded that contaminated feed is the most likely source of infection. This is because the infectious agent that causes BSE has the ability to remain active for many years. Cattle may have been exposed to contaminated feed because the BSE infectious agent was present where feed was stored or handled. A second possibility is that contaminated feed ingredients may have been imported from non-EU countries.
Experts could not rule out other causes due to the difficulty of investigating individual cases. Some constraints are the long incubation period of the disease and the lack of detailed information available from farms at the time of the trace-back investigation.
EFSA experts made a series of recommendations to maintain and strengthen the EU monitoring and reporting system, and to evaluate new scientific data that become available.
The European response to BSE
The coordinated European response to BSE has succeeded in reducing the prevalence of the disease. Between 2005 and 2015 about 73,000,000 cattle were tested for BSE in the EU, out of which 60 born after the ban tested positive for classical BSE. The number of affected animals rises to 1,259 if cattle born before the ban are included. The number of classical BSE cases has dropped significantly in the EU over time, from 554 cases reported in 2005 to just two in 2015 (both animals born after the ban). Moreover the EU food safety system is designed to prevent the entry of BSE-contaminated meat into the food chain.
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
